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Brentano’s Latter-day Monism
According to “existence monism”, there is only one concrete particular, the 
cosmos as a whole (Horgan and Potrč 2000, 2008). According to “priori-
ty monism,” there are many concrete particulars, but all are ontologically 
dependent upon the cosmos as a whole, which accordingly is the only fun-
damental concrete particular (Schaffer 2010a, 2010b). In essence, the diffe-
rence between them is that existence monism does not recognize any parts 
of the cosmos, whereas priority monism does – it just insists that the parts 
are ontologically dependent upon the whole in this case. 
Brentano never maintained either of these views. But in the last two 
years of his life, he seems to have held the following approximation: there 
is only one physical substance, namely, the material universe as a whole. This 
is twice removed from existence or priority monism: first, it allows for a 
plurality of mental substances (souls); secondly, it allows for a plurality of 
physical accidents, which in Brentano’s reistic ontology are also concrete 
particulars (see Kriegel 2015). Still, the view that the only physical sub-
stance is the universe as a whole is quite radical and finds little precedent in 
the history of philosophy. 
The view is developed explicitly by Brentano in only one dictation, 
dated 30 January 1915 (Brentano N7 infra, p. 55 ff.). The manuscript is 
archived at Harvard’s Houghton Library under the title “The Lorentz-
Einstein  Question.” Kastil included a rather heavily edited version of the 
piece, re-entitled “The Nature of the Physical World in Light of the The-
ory of Categories,” as an appendix to the Kategorienlehre (Brentano 1933: 
296–301/1981a: 208–211).1 Although Brentano does not develop the idea 
anywhere else, it often seems to constrain, and sometimes to irrigate, his 
speculations on space and matter in the last two years of his life (see Bren-
70
tano 1976/1988). Below, I present Brentano’s view (§1), then his argument 
for it (§2), as expounded in the relevant text. 
1. The View
Brentano’s very first statement of his brand of monism is this:
… one might go as far as to conjecture that the totality of physical matter 
(Gesamtheit des Körperlichen) constitutes a single stationary physical sub-
stance (einzige ruhende Körpersubstanz), which would be littered (da und 
dort behaftet) with certain particular accidents… [O]ur mechanical laws, as 
well as everything physics, chemistry, and physiology have established, 
would pertain to these accidents and their changes and mutual interactions. 
(Brentano 1933: 298/1981a: 209)
Imagine a big, quivering, translucent ball, under the surface of which ap-
pear, disappear, and reappear various vaguely glowing color patches. If 
the color appearances evolve in sufficiently systematic ways, we might be 
tempted to posit colorful ‘things’ or entities that ‘travel’ just below the ball’s 
surface, ‘bump into’ each other, change directions, and so on. And we might 
wish to formulate the natural laws that govern these patches’ behavior and 
interactions. But for all that, there may be no ‘things’ under there – there 
may just be undifferentiated stuff that exhibits different colors in different 
places at different times. We could study the laws that govern changes in 
the colors exhibited, but we should resist the temptation to think of these 
as laws describing the persistence and interaction of a multitude of inde-
pendent entities.
Brentano’s universe is of course very different from this ball: it does 
not quiver, but is strictly immobile, and it is probably not spherical, but has 
some arbitrary, brutely contingent shape (Brentano 1933: 301/1981a: 211). 
Nonetheless, like this ball it does not host any independent things or ob-
jects, but instead seems to be a single unitary ‘blobject’ that simply exhibits 
a certain (spatial and temporal) qualitative structure.
In some respects, the picture Brentano presents very much reminds 
of Horgan and Potrč’s existence monism (which they also call “blobjecti-
vism”). On the other hand, in accounting for the world’s qualitative hetero-
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geneity, Brentano avails himself quite insouciantly of locations and indeed 
parts of the world: 
In place of the ether there would be the stationary, unitary substance (ru-
hende, einheitliche Substanz). In place of what had formerly been regarded 
as the substances of physical matter, there would be accidents inhering in 
(haftend an) the [stationary unitary] substance, which would be transmitted 
from one part (Teil) of it to another. The laws of mechanics would per-
tain to the interchange and persistence of these accidents. (1933: 298/1981a: 
209)
Here Brentano speaks explicitly of the universe’s parts. In another pas-
sage, he speaks of the universe’s portions/parcels (Parzellen) (1933: 
299–300/1981a: 209–10, quoted more fully in §2). But if the universe has 
parts, strictly speaking it cannot be the only material object, as blobjectivism 
requires.2 Instead, we appear to have on our hands something more like 
priority monism. 
This may well be Brentano’s ultimate view. After all, he is a monist 
only about material substance. He is perfectly happy to accept a plurality 
of material objects, as long as only one of them is a substance. The others 
are accidents. As Brentano writes in the passage just quoted, instead of ‘the 
substances of physical matter, there would be accidents inhering in the [cos-
mos], which would be transmitted from one part of it to another.’ This 
may sound as though the cosmos has certain properties, rather than includes 
certain parts, but this is only because accidents are traditionally taken to be 
properties. Given that Brentano construes accidents as a special kind of con-
crete particular, it is clear that in allowing the world to have accidents, Bren-
tano is allowing for a multiplicity of concrete particulars. At the same time, 
since Brentano’s account of substance and accident preserves the traditional 
notion that accidents ontologically depend (unilaterally) upon substances, 
his view entails that there is only one ontologically independent concrete 
particular – the material universe as a whole. Perhaps we could summarize 
the view by saying that it combines priority monism about (physical) con-
crete particulars and existence monism about (physical) substance.
There is another question to consider, though, regarding what exactly is 
“the cosmos,” or at least the material cosmos (setting aside such immaterial 
beings as there might be). Three main approaches present themselves: (i) 
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the cosmos as spacetime; (ii) the cosmos as the totality of matter filling up 
spacetime; (iii) spacetime plus the matter filling it up. Schaffer, for exam-
ple, seems to support the first option (Schaffer 2009). Brentano, though, 
would presumably go for the second option, given that he treats “empty 
space” as a pseudo-referring expression akin to “the hole in the wall” and 
“the lack of enthusiasm.” In a clear statement of reism from 1904, he as-
serts that “there is nothing other than things, and ‘empty space’ and ‘object 
of thought’ do not name things” (Brentano 1930: 79/1966b: 68). In a 1915 
dictation, he writes: “An empty space needs to be something positive just 
as little as does the absence of a sound when a sound is skipped in playing 
a scale” (Brentano 1976: 178/1988: 150) – a remark he repeats in different 
variations throughout the piece. If Brentano is unwilling to countenance in 
his ontology regions of space unfilled by matter, it would seem that for him 
it is only that “material filling” that is real. 
Brentano’s monism about the physical world can thus be characterized 
through the conjunction of the following three theses: (1) There exists only 
one material substance, the cosmos as a whole; (2) this substance is just the 
totality of physical matter (“Gesamtheit des Körperlichen”); (3) it has parts, 
which however (i) are not themselves substances and (ii) depend for their 
existence on the one material substance. 
2. The Argument
Modern monism is sometimes motivated by considerations drawn from 
physics, in particular the phenomenon of quantum entanglement (Schaf-
fer 2010a: 50–55, Calosi 2014). Interestingly, Brentano similarly motivates 
monism by appeal to one of the burning questions of the physics of his 
day, namely, the null result of the Michelson-Morely experiment. Let me 
explain the result, then Brentano’s argument from it.
Suppose you sit in a small room and watch your friend tap-dancing. If all 
the air is instantaneously literally “sucked out of the room,” you will no lon-
ger be able to hear those taps. The reason is that without the air, the sound 
waves bringing the sound to your ears will be unable to travel. Sound waves 
are waves of or in something – in this case air (hence ‘airwaves’). Sound does 
not need air to travel through, it can also travel through water, helium, and 
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so forth. But it does need some kind of medium – some substance must be 
undulating if sound waves are to occur.
This might be thought to raise a question: how can light travel from 
faraway stars and reach our eyes through empty space, if there is no similar 
undulating medium for light waves to travel through? Many nineteenth-
century physicists were bothered by this question, arguing that the space 
between us and those faraway stars cannot be real vacuum; instead, it must 
be filled with some unusually unimposing substance, a kind of pervasive 
lighter-than-light foam-stuff, through which light waves travel. 
On this picture, the earth does not revolve in a void, but rather ‘swims’ 
through this foam-stuff. Now, just as when you swim in otherwise moti-
onless water, you create a current around you, one would expect the earth 
to produce its own extraordinarily light ‘current’ as it swims through the 
foam-stuff. And in the normal go of things, this should mean that light 
waves would travel faster ‘downstream’ than ‘upstream,’ that is, against the 
earth’s motion than along it. This speed difference is precisely what the 
1887 Michelson-Morely experiment failed to find. Try it any way you like, 
it seems light travels through the foam equally fast in all directions, regard-
less of what and how bodies are moving in it. 
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, physicists were preoccupied 
with trying to explain this striking null result. Michelson himself thought 
it showed that the foam – better known as ether – was not actually sta-
tionary, but was ‘dragged along’ by bodies as they moved about space (a 
hypothesis aired already in the 1840s by George Stokes). Lorentz insisted 
that the foam was stationary, conjecturing that as bodies swam through 
it they contracted in the direction of their movement, thus producing a 
weaker current behind them than they would otherwise – exactly as much 
weaker, in fact, as would be needed to cancel out the speeding up of light’s 
downstream travel! Einstein’s special relativity, however, made room for 
the simplest explanation of the null result – the explanation that there sim-
ply is no ether, so naturally it has no effect on the behavior of light. Einstein 
reverted to Newton’s old idea that light does not travel in waves at all, and 
thus does not depend on the existence of an undulating substance or medi-
um. Instead, light is corpuscular – there are tiny particles of light that move 
through empty space in just the same way, say, the Earth does. These light 
particles are of course the photons. As is well known, ultimately photons 
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(and soon thereafter electrons) came to be thought of as something in-bet-
ween particles and waves, exhibiting properties of both. 
It is in this context, of trying to explain the Michelson-Morely null re-
sult, that Brentano offers up his monist hypothesis. He writes:
I believe that only through such a [monist] recasting (Umbildung) of our 
conception of the physical world (Körperwelt) do certain paradoxes, which 
face our physicists [Lorentz and Einstein] due to the results of Michelson’s 
and related experiments, resolve themselves easiest. This recasting would 
pave the way to a somewhat deeper grasp of the physical world; the noti-
on of the unitary substance (einheitliche Substanz) taking the ether’s place 
would make much more sense than what we have been taught about the 
ether’s oddities (Eigenheiten), especially its impenetrability, and would 
also cast so-called Matter (Materie) in a totally new light. (Brentano 1933: 
299–300/1981a: 210) 
How does monism help with Michelson-Morely? Brentano is a tad telegra-
phic on that; the only comment of relevance seems to be this:
As for light and electricity radiation (Strahlungen), it is not impossible to 
conjure up a plausible story (geeignet Vorstellungen bilden) that bears some 
analogy to both the [particle] emission theory and the [wave] undulation 
theory, which would do justice to the phenomena just as well as them, if not 
better. It would not be concerned with oscillations or relocations of parts of 
the substance underlying the rays (Strahlen) … but only with the relocation 
of qualities, which may be thought of as dividing into very small parcels/
portions (Parzellen). In this way everything remains in essence unaltered… 
(Brentano 1933: 299–300/1981a: 209–10)
The idea seems to be this. Light radiates neither in waves nor in corpuscles. 
In fact, there are neither waves nor corpuscles – there is no undulating 
medium like Lorentz’s ether and there are no light particles like Einstein’s 
photons. Instead, there is a single, immobile substance with undifferen-
tiated, homogeneous constitution that is simply qualitatively different in 
different places. That is, there is qualitative variation in the world, but no 
quantitative variety. Accordingly, the transmission of light from A to B in-
volves neither traveling particles nor an undulating medium; it is just a 
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matter of the universe exhibiting the relevant light qualities in A at one 
time and in B at a later time. The laws of mechanics describe the regularities 
governing such changes in qualities across the single substance that is the 
universe, not any processes that might involve the interaction of separate 
objects. The Michelson-Morely null result simply tells us something about 
what these regularity laws are; it raises no deep puzzle once we stop expec-
ting there to be an undulating medium through which light travels. 
Conclusion
It is doubtful that Brentano’s argument is a cogent reason to go monist. 
Presumably there are other ways to accommodate the Michelson-Morely 
result, notably Einstein’s special relativity (see Einstein 1920 §16). At the 
same time, it is striking that Brentano suggested that the underlying phy-
sical reality is more fundamental than either particles or waves a decade 
before de Broglie hypothesized essentially the same (for which he earned 
the 1929 Nobel prize). Perhaps the deep thrust of Brentano’s argument for 
his brand of monism is this idea: only if the cosmos is forsooth a single 
unitary substance can we make sense of the idea that matter is neither fully 
corpuscular nor fully wavy. 
In a 1914 dictation, Brentano succinctly states the kinds of item he would 
countenance in his ultimate ontological inventory:
An existent (Seiendes) in the proper sense is not only any substance, any 
plurality (Mehrheit) of substances, and any part of a substance, but also any 
accident. (Brentano 1933: 11/1981a: 19)
Against the monist background, and on the assumption that souls (i.e., 
mental substances) have no parts, Brentano’s ontology would include five 
kinds of item: the material universe, certain parts of the material universe 
(namely, those that have the right qualitative homogeneity), souls, every 
plurality of souls, and every mereological sum of the material universe and 
a plurality of souls.3 
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Notes
1 As was his want, Kastil took considerable liberties with the original text. Having 
inspected the original manuscript, however, I do not find that Kastil at any point 
misinterprets Brentano.
2 Clearly, Brentano needs the world to have parts in order to account for its qualitative 
structure. Blobjectivism denies that the world has parts, but it can avail itself of 
properties in accounting for the world’s structure. These must be special properties, 
exhibited only by the world – properties of the form being-F-in-L-at-t – but pending 
special difficulties with such properties, it is legitimate for the blobjectivist to appeal 
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to them. Brentano, however, rejects properties, so he must account for the world’s 
qualitative structure in terms of concrete particulars, which would presumably be parts 
of the world. 
3 For comments on an ancestor of this paper, I am grateful to Anna Giustina and 
Jonathan Schaffer.
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